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THE SCOPE OF CROSS-EXAMINATION IN
ILLINOIS
ROBERT J. BURDETT'
TRIALS have been conducted for centuries; witnesses
have furnished evidence orally since the "memory
of man runneth not to the contrary;" and the art of
practice, including the examination of witnesses, has
flourished during the greater part of two centuries.
Little is to be found in the early civil law, however,
regarding the scope of cross-examination. That it was
not strictly confined may be surmised, for Quintillian
wrote:
On matters without the cause, also many serviceable matters are
often put to a witness; as concerning the character of other
witnesses; concerning his own; whether anything dishonorable
or mean can be laid to the charge of any of them; whether they
have any friendship with the prosecutor, or enmity against the
defendant; in replying to which they are likely to say something
of which we may take advantage, or may be convicted of false-
hood or malevolence.2
Although we can hardly admire the tactics of the
Roman orator, and his quibbling over the credibility of
the witness, it does seem apparent that he was highly
skilled, by his method of examination, in making the tes-
timony of an adverse witness as little effective as
possible.
In the common law, we find that cross-examination was
confined merely to the issues, and that one could prove
his whole case by that mode of examination if he so
desired. The same was true in this country4 and in
England5 until 1827, although there is scarcely a citation
I Member of Chicago Bar Ass'n.
2 Quintillian, Institutes of Oratory, B.5, Ch. 7, p. 30.
3Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 1885.
4 Fulton Bank v. Stafford, 2 Wend. 483.
5 Fletcher v. Crosbie, 2 M. & Rob. 417.
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of authority. This, no doubt, is due to a uniform prac-
tice in which no contrary view was known. In 1827,
however, a decision by a Pennsylvania court held that
cross-examination should be confined to the issues and,
by way of dictum, that perhaps the proper rule should
confine cross-examination to the matter elicited on
direct.6 It was also stated that matter could not be
brought out which tended to prove the case of the person
doing the cross-examining. No authority is cited in this
case.
In 1840, Justice Story held in a decision of the
United States Supreme Court that a party has no
right to cross-examine any witness except as to facts
and circumstances connected with the matters stated in
his direct examination. 7 It may have been, as one court
suggested,8 that the justice was merely expounding the
law of the state where the trial was had in the particular
case; but whatever the source of the law, the rule has
since become well established.9
Arguments are available for and against the old and
the new rule. It is said, on one side, that the new rule
leads only to helpless confusion,' ° and, on the other hand,
that the old rule deprives the person introducing the
witness of the right to impeach the witness testifying
for the other side." It is our purpose, however, to state
what the Illinois law is, rather than to argue for the
merits of either the old or new rule.
The law was early laid down in Illinois in accordance
with the rule expounded by the Supreme Court of the
United States 12 in the following language:
Whilst a large discretion is necessary to be exercised by
courts, in the manner of disposing of business, still some rules of
practice are inflexible. Long experience has demonstrated that
6 Ellmaker v. Buckley, 16 Serg. & R. 72.
7 The Philadelphia and Trenton Railroad Co. v. Simpson, 14 Pet. 448.
8 Rush v. French, 1 Ariz. 99.
9 Wigmore on Evidence, Section 1890.
10 New York Iron Mine v. Negaunee Bank, 39 Mich. 644.
11 Stafford v. Fargo, 35 Ill. 481.
12 Stafford v. Fargo, 35 Ill. 481.
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certain rules of practice are indispensable to the attainment of
justice, whilst others conduce largely to the attainment of that
end. It seems to be the well recognized rule that when a witness
is called by one party, the other has only the right to cross-
examine upon the facts to which he testified in chief. If he can
give evidence beneficial to the other party, he should call him
at the proper time, and make him his own witness and examine
him in chief, thereby giving the other party the benefit of a
cross-examination on such evidence in chief. Otherwise, the party
calling the witness would be deprived of a cross-examination
as to evidence called out by the other side, and the party against
whom the witness was first called would obtain the advantage
of getting evidence under the latitude allowed in a cross-
examination. It may be that unless the court could see that
such an examination had resulted in injury to the opposite
party, the judgment would not be reversed for that reason
alone; but being calculated to work injury, such a practice
should be discouraged. In this case, Lyon was called to prove
a single fact, and the cross-examination should have been limited
to that fact.
Perhaps the most comprehensive statement by an Illi-
nois court of the general rule of the proper scope of
cross-examination is contained in the following quotation
from a later decision :13
The scope of cross-examination is necessarily largely within
the discretion of the trial court, being governed by the direct
testimony of the witness and other circumstances attending the
giving of his evidence, and it has been held to be erroneous
for the trial court to restrict the cross-examination to the extent
of preventing the party from going only into the matters con-
nected with the examination in chief, it being the right to elicit
suppressed facts which weaken or qualify the case of the party
introducing the witness or supporting the case of the party
cross-examining. A witness may be cross-examined as to his
direct testimony in all of its bearings, and as to whatever goes
to explain or modify or discredit what he has stated in his first
examination.
13 Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Creech, 207 Iil. 400.
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The fact that the scope of cross-examination is largely
within the discretion of the trial court should not be
forgotten; "the latitude to be allowed in the cross-
examination of witnesses rests largely in the discretion
of the trial court, and a cause will not be reversed
for alleged improper rulings in that respect unless such
discretion has been clearly abused," is the language used
by the Supreme Court in one instance. 14  Thus it is
generally held that unless injury clearly appears from
an abuse of this discretion the cause will not for that
reason alone be reversed. 15
It has already been stated that the early common law
rule made it possible for a person to prove his own case
without the introduction of a single witness of his own.
There have been decisions directly in conflict with this
rule in Illinois, and in strict conformity with the rule
stated in the Fargo and Creech cases, already cited.
Chief among these is the case where the plaintiff testified
that she had purchased a sewing machine of the defen-
dant, and the latter attempted to prove his case on
cross-examination by introducing an agreement which
purported to be a lease of the machine. It was held
that proving of defendant's case upon the cross-exami-
nation of the plaintiff was properly refused by the
court.1 6
Another apt case illustrates that the common law rule
does not apply in Illinois.
The plaintiff testified that the defendant had admitted
he was liable in the amount of $1,458.96 as shown by a
paper which was produced by the witness, and that if
he, the witness, would pay the amount, the defendant
would repay him with interest. The defense was a set-
off, and upon cross-examination, the defendant sought to
bring out evidence through the plaintiff proving this
defense. Objection was sustained to this line of ques-
14 Brennen v. Carterville Coal Co., 241 I1. 610.
15 Cooper v. Randall et al., 59 Ill. 317; Hartshorn v. Byrne, 147 III.
418.
16Wheeler & Wilson Co. v. Barrett, 172 Ill. 610.
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tioning and assigned as error. It was held that the ruling
of the court was proper.17
In another case, the plaintiff testified merely that cattle
were those described in a certain chattel mortgage in
suit. It was held to constitute error to examine the
witness on topics such as the consideration for the mort-
gage, the state of accounts between the parties, and the
admissions of the plaintiff subsequent to the making of
the mortgage.' 8 The court has also said that cross-
examination of the complainant to show a lack of neces-
sary parties where there has been no related testimony
on direct examination is in error.19 Where-after direct
examination of the plaintiff's witness on the merits-
the defendant sought to show on cross-examination that
the complainant was a fictitious person and that the
attorney was prosecuting the case without authority, the
questioning was properly refused.20
Books were sought to be introduced on cross-exami-
nation of a witness to rebut his testimony. Regardless
of the propriety of this procedure, the court said that
at any rate they could not be introduced until the person
cross-examining started to prove his case.21
In summary of the general rule as laid down by the
Illinois courts we have found that while the scope of
cross-examination is confined to the matter brought forth
in the direct examination, it is wide enough to elicit
matters which explain, qualify, weaken, and break down
the direct testimony; that the discretion of the trial court
as governed by the particular circumstances before it,
such as the demeanor of the witness, his prejudice and
unwillingness, the matter in issue, and difficulty of proof,
governs in the majority of instances, unless some hard-
ship is worked on those involved; that in no event-
except with the permission of the parties-may the
17 Rigdon v. Conley, 141 Ill. 565.
IS Bell v. Prewitt, 62 111. 361.
19 McKone v. Williams, 37 Ill. App. 591.
20 Emerson v. Fleming, 246 Ill. 353.
21 Peru Coal Co. v. Merrick, 79 I1. 112.
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opposing case be introduced on the cross-examination of
a witness.
Let us ascertain at this point the rules which govern
the introduction of cross-examination and the manner in
which it is conducted. Where there are several parties
to the suit on either side and their cases are separate,
each has the right to cross-examine the witness individ-
ually; but if their defenses, or cases, are common to them
all, then there may be no reason for this. 22 A party may
not cross-examine his own witness, 23 and it has been held
that where the scope of proper cross-examination has
been exceeded, then the witness becomes the witness of
the party who is so violating the rules of evidence.
24
A co-defendant who has offered no evidence, and has
announced his intention of moving for, and abiding by,
a directed verdict at the close of the plaintiff's testimony,
may be permitted to cross-examine other defendants'
witnesses, but in this event the evidence adduced by the
other defendant may be considered against him.25 Where
all the evidence of a witness on direct examination has
been refused, the trial court commits no error in refusing
to permit cross-examination of such witness. 26  It is
error to refuse a party who has inadvertently made a
remark offensive to the trial judge the right to cross-
examine a witness. 27 It is within the discretion of the
trial court to permit a witness to be called for re-cross
examination.2 8
Abusive and embarrassing questions, as well as bully-
ing and degrading questions, are improper 29, and harsh-
ness of bearing and intemperance of language are
frowned on in such examination."0 Questions which are
22 Kerfoot v. Cronin et al., 105 Ill. 609.
28 Singer, etc., Stone Co. v. Hutchinson, 184 Ill. 169.
24 Chicago Ex. Bldg. Co. v. Merchants' Bldg. Co., 83 Ill. App. 241.
25 Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v. Likes, 225 Ill. 249.
26 Singer v. Hutchinson, 183 Ill. 606.
27 Whiteman v. The People, 83 Ill. App. 369.
28U. S. Wringer v. Cooney, 214 Ill. 520; Hirsch & Sons Iron Co. v.
Coleman, 227 Ill. 149.
29 Toledo, Wabash & Western Ry. Co. v. Williams, 77 Ill. 354.
SO Ochs et al. v. The People, 124 Ill. 399.
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not relevant nor proper, put to the witness with the in-
tention o embarrassing him or of creating an unfavor-
able inference for the jury to draw, are not allowable
by the trial court.31
A number of exceptions, or apparent exceptions, to the
rule that cross-examination must be confined to matters
brought out on direct are recognized by the courts. The
first of these exceptions occurs in the examination of a
hostile witness. It is uniformly held that in the exami-
nation of a hostile witness more than ordinary latitude
will be allowed by the court.3 2  The reason for this is
elemental and exists whether the witness is called for
direct examination or for cross-examination.3 3 However,
this exceptional latitude will not be allowed to a cross-
examiner who feigns surprise at the testimony of the
witness, where there is no basis in the record to show
that the witness had changed his course of testimony.3 4
The next of the exceptions to the general rule is that
where matters of fraud are in issue, more than ordinary
scope is allowable on cross-examination.3 5 Even this rule
is confined and is left in most cases to the discretion
of the court.3 6 An example of the way in which the ex-
ception is confined is shown by the ruling of the court
in the Springer case just cited. There the action was
based on fraud and deceit in the sale of certain notes
which were but a few of a series. Reference was made
on direct examination to other sales of the same series,
and the cross-examination was limited to the naming of
the parties who purchased these, excluding answers to
questions as to whether trouble was experienced with
the sale of each of the notes.
31 Atchison v. McKinnie, 233 I1. 106.
82 Consolidated Coal Co. v. Seniger, 179 Ill. 370; North American
Restaurant v. McElligott, 227 Ill. 317.
53Consolidated Coal Co. v. Seniger, 179 Inl. 370; North American
Restaurant v. McElligott, 227 fI1. 317.
34 O'Donnell v. The People, 110 Ill. App. 250.
835Fabian v. Traeger, 215 Ill. 220; Strohm v. Hayes, 70 111. 41.
36 Schwitters v. Springer, 236 Ill. 271; Hollenback v. Todd et al., 119
111. 543.
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The Todd case arose under an issue that the trans-
action involved was in fraud of creditors. The witness
testified on direct that all he had when he went into the
warehouse business was a team of horses, two sets of
harness, and a buggy-that he had no money. He was
asked on cross-examination whether he had the horses,
harness, and buggy at the time of the trial, and to what
extent Todd and Merrill (the other parties to the alleg-
edly fraudulent transaction) were paid while they
worked for the witness in the warehouse. Objection was
sustained to the cross-examination. In reviewing the
case the Supreme Court said:
We think these questions should have been admitted. The charge
was that the transaction between appellee and Todd and Terrell
was one in fraud of creditors, and the rule should be liberal in
allowing a full examination of parties to such an alleged fraud,
when they appear as witnesses.37
Another of the exceptions to the general rule as to the
scope of the examination by the adverse side is found in
the examination of an expert witness. 38 Because of the
very nature of the evidence adduced by an expert witness,
the other side is entitled to question it closely, since the
facts are solved for the jury by such testimony. All of
the facts stated in the hypothetical questions may be
altered on cross-examination to correspond to the theory
of the case of the one cross-examining, 39 and the quali-
fications of the witness may be questioned minutely.40
Another instance where the courts extend the usual
latitude in the scope of cross-examination is that where
the party to the case is a witness. Where the plaintiff
proved the value of the property, his expense, and the
fact that the property had not been returned in a suit
for replevin, he was examined by the other side on mat-
87 Hollenback v. Todd et al., 119 Ill. 543.
38West Chicago Street Ry. Co. v. Fishman, 169 Ill. 196; The People
v. Sawhill, 299 I1. 393.
39Kenna v. Calumet, Hammond & Southeastern R. R. Co., 284 I1.
301; City of Aledo v. Honeyman, 208 Il1. 415.
40 The People v. Sawhill, 299 Ill. 393.
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ter that was not included in the direct. It was held that
there was more latitude in the cross-examination of a
witness where the witness was a party to the suit, "and
where the cross-examination has not been confined strictly
to the examination in chief, it will not be held error
unless it appears that there has been an abuse of the
exercise of a sound legal discretion." '41 There is little
difference in the scope allowed where the witness is a
party when the matter sought to be elicited on cross-
examination tends to prove an affirmative defense, and
so works injury to the one examined.42
In criminal cases it is held that liberal cross-exami-
nation must be allowed.43 But, where a witness is called
by the court at the instance of a state's attorney, the
cross-examination of the witness by the prosecutor must
be closely curtailed, 44 and is seldom to be commended. 45
An example of the scope allowed in this class of cases,
where so much is involved, arose in a case in which the
charge was murder, the motive was robbery, and the
issue was an alibi, the evidence of which was strongly
conflicting. The cross-examining counsel asked a ques-
tion of a state's witness which was objected to because
it had been answered in a previous, more general inter-
rogatory. The objection was sustained and the review-
ing court in considering the question used the following
language:
The purpose of cross-examination is to test the truthfulness,
candor, intelligence, memory, etc., of the witness. We do not
understand that counsel may not, for that purpose, assume that
any previous answer made by the witness is untrue, either from
wilfulness or want of recollection, and put his questions in vari-
ous forms to show that fact. He does not thereby assume the
witness has testified to a fact which he has not testified to.46
41 Hanchett v. Kimbark et al., 118 Ill. 121.
42 Hansen v. Miller, 145 Ill. 538.
48 Ritzman v. The People, 110 Ill. 362; Halloway v. The People, 181
Ill. 544; Tracy v. The People, 97 Ill. 101; Davids v. The People, 192 Ill.
176.
44 The People v. Cleminson, 250 Ill. 135.
45 The People v. Bernstein, 250 Ill. 63.
46Briggs v. The People, 219 Ill. 330.
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Application of the rules above set forth seems diffi-
cult, because the circumstances of each case are so varied
that no two cases appear similar enough possibly to be
governed by the same rule, but it is hoped that upon
an examination of various cases, we shall be able to
foretell the action of the court in a given case.
We first consider the question of insolvency, which is
sometimes perplexing to prove. The problem would: be
simple if it were possible on cross-examination to ques-
tion the party whose insolvency is sought to be proved,
concerning the fact. But the Supreme Court of Illinois
has held that where the question of insolvency has been
avoided on direct, it is not permissible to question con-
cerning it on cross-examination. 47 However, it may well
be that in the particular case the exceptions heretofore
discussed might be availed of to introduce the desired
testimony.
Will contests have to do in many instances with men-
tal competency. To this class of cases the rules laid
down above apply. So where a witness was asked on
direct examination to state his opinion as to the sound-
ness of mind of the testator, it was held that cross-
examination as to his habits of abusing his family without
provocation was improper.48  And conversely, where
direct examination brought out only conversations and
actions towards his family, it was held improper to cross-
examine concerning his industry and habits of business. 49
Again, where the witness was asked what the testator
had said about a certain suit which had been on trial,
it was not error for the trial court to refuse to permit
the witness to answer on cross-examination questions
concerning conversations of the testator about his heirs
and the making of a will, which was matter unrelated
to that deduced on direct examination. 50 When a witness
was examined on direct concerning the mental condition
47 Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass'n v. Hutmacher, 127 Il1. 652.
48Petefish v. Becker, 176 Ill. 448.
49 Petefish v. Becker, 176 Iln. 448.
50 Compher v. Browning, 219 Il1. 429.
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of the testator, it was found improper to cross-examine
as to the family relations of the testator.5 And where,
on direct, the testimony concerned the single transaction
of the decedent's purchase of horses, evidence introduced
to prove testamentary capacity, it was improper to cross-
examine the witness as to the temper of the decedent.5 2
The direct examination of a witness in one case con-
cerned facts occurring during the years from 1892 to
1895. A will in this case was executed in 1894 by the
testator who died in 1898. Similar facts to those elicited
on direct, but extending to the year 1898, were sought
to be brought out on cross-examination. This was held
improper.5 3
Conversations constitute an ample part of the proof
offered in evidence in many cases. It has been held that
it is improper to bring out, by cross-examination, con-
versations in which the bad feelings arose, for the pur-
pose of showing that the witness harbors bad feelings
towards the party against whom he testifies.54
The defendant, on the stand for the cross-examination,
was asked if he had written a certain letter, which con-
tained an admission, and whose contents were thus in
evidence. It was complained that a letter in reply to
which the one in evidence was written, should have been
introduced first. It was held that it could have been
introduced on* re-direct. The court said, "The rule is
that the whole of an admission is to be taken together,
and that when part of a conversation or statement is
put in evidence by one party, the other is entitled to put
in the whole, so far as it is relevant, and it makes no dif-
ference whether the whole statement comes out upon the
direct examination, or part of it is drawn out on cross-
examination." ' 55 The courts have also said that where
the conversation is first mentioned on the cross-exami-
51 Larabee v. Larabee, 240 fl. 576.
52 Larabee v. Larabee, 240 Il1. 576.
53 Entwlstle v. Meikle, 180 Ill. 9.
54 Davison v. The People, 90 Ill. 221.
55 Barnes v. Northern Trust Co., 169 Ill. 112.
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nation, the counsel cross-examining does not become enti-
tled to have all of the conversation brought out. 58 How-
ever, the rule is equally well settled that where part of
the conversation is brought out on direct examination,
the cross-examiner is entitled to have all of the conver-
sation in evidence. 57 A witness may be asked if he ever
had a conversation concerning the conversation in ques-
tion upon cross-examination. 58
The next topic with which we have to deal is that of
expert witnesses. From this discussion testimony con-
cerning handwriting is omitted, since it has its place in
another subject.
Value is the first division of expert testimony selected
for discussion. The following facts arose in a condem-
nation case. The witness testified that he was familiar
with the property involved, and said that a sale of ad-
joining land was made the year prior to the suit. He
further testified that all he knew of the transaction he
had ascertained from the record, and that he found the
consideration for the sale from the deed. He based his
opinion on his own knowledge, and upon pertinent fac-
tors such as transportation. It was contended that
cross-examination of the witness was unduly restricted
by the trial court. In review the following was said:
The weight of the testimony of expert witnesses in regard to
the value of property depends largely upon the facts and rea-
sons which lie at the basis of their opinions. In other words,
the opinions, given by experts, should be based upon facts within
their actual knowledge, and which they are prepared to state.
"While in the examination in chief, the expert can only be
questioned in a general way as to the reasons of his opinion,
the cross-examiner is entitled in every instance to demand a
free disclosure, minutely and in detail, of all the facts and cir-
cumstances upon which the expert's opinion has been grounded."
Upon cross-examination great latitude is allowed, so
56 Hansen v. Miller, 145 Ill. 538.
57 Black v. Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Ry. Co., 111 Ill. 351.
58 Dexter v. Harrison, 146 Ill. 169.
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as to enable the jury to see upon what basis the witness has
made his estimate of value, and what facts have induced him
to form the opinion he has expressed. But a large discretion
is necessarily left to the trial judge in determining the range
proper to be allowed counsel in cross-examining witnesses. Of
course, in such cases, the discretion exercised by the court in
regulating or limiting the cross-examination, should be a reason-
able discretion, and cross-examination should not be excluded
on subjects embraced or included in the examination in chief
if such ruling is calculated to prejudice the examining party.
In other words, so far as the cross-examination of a witness
relates either to facts in issue or facts relevant to the issue, it
may be pursued as a matter of right.59
Thus it was held that further cross-examination on the
subject of the information disclosed by the record was
immaterial, and therefore not prejudicial in its refusal.
Where a witness in a condemnation suit said that there
was a good well on the land, which a right of way would
cut off, objection was properly sustained as to cross-
examination concerning other apt places for a well.60
It was found improper to ask a real estate appraiser,
who testified as to the value of'property, how his income
in the real estate business compared with that of an
appraiser.6 1 Where a witness was examined as to the
value of the property and the benefit of the improvement
to it, it was considered improper to ask if the city would
be benefited by the improvement.
62
Upon cross-examination [of an expert who testifies as to phys.
ical condition], any fact which, in the sound discretion of the
court, is pertinent to the inquiry, whether testified to by anyone
or not, may be assumed in a hypothetical question, with the
view of testing the skill, learning, or accuracy of the expert,
or to ascertain the reasonableness or expose the unreasonableness
of the opinion he has expressed to the jury. . A ques-
59 Spohr v. City of Chicago, 206 Ill. 441.
60 Chicago, Bloomington & Decatur Ry. Co. v. Kelly, 221 Ill. 498.
61 Gordon v. City of Chicago, 201 Ill. 623.
62 Sheedy v. City of Chicago, 221 Ill. 111.
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tion, although it goes beyond the scope of the evidence, may be
propounded upon cross-examination, if its office and purpose is
to elicit the reason upon which the expert based an opinion
expressed by him in his examination in chief, or to ascertain
the extent of his learning and knowledge of the particular sub-
ject upon which he assumes to be an expert.0
Thus, the facts included in the hypothetical question
on direct examination may be varied by the cross-
examiner to meet the theory of his case. 64
Where something an expert on direct examination pro-
claims to be impossible has happened in another case,
the expert may be cross-examined with regard to such
other case. To illustrate this, a case arose from a train
accident. An engineer, qualified as an expert, was asked
if it were possible to be hit and thrown 40 feet by a
train and live to tell of it. He testified that in his opin-
ion such an accident always brought death. He was
permitted to be cross-examined as to his knowledge of a
person who was thrown 50 feet by a locomotive and who
was still living.65
An expert witness testifying to physical conditions
may not as a general rule be interrogated on cross-
examination as to other cases. To quote the Illinois
Supreme Court:
The next error assigned is the ruling of the trial court in the
limiting of the cross-examination of a medical witness named
McGregor. The evidence shows that he was a practicing phys-
ician, and had made an examination of appellee as to her
injuries and testified concerning the result of such examination.
Upon cross-examination appellant's counsel asked him concern-
ing the manner in which he conducted the examination, and
then asked him the following two questions: "Is that the usual
way in which you make these examinations as to be so identified
as to the time when an injury takes place-is that your usual
custom?" "Do you, as a rule, make that inquiry when you
68 West Chicago Street Ry. Co. v. Fishman, 169 Ill. 196.
64 City of Aledo v. Honeyman, 208 I1. 415.
65 Chicago & Alton R. R. Co. v. Lewandowski, 190 11. 301.
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make examinations of that kind?" Objections to both of these
questions were made by counsel for the plaintiff and the objec-
tions sustained. The evidence shows that full cross-examination
was permitted by the trial court as to the manner in which the
particular examination had been made, and there was no error
in refusing to permit counsel for the appellant to cross-examine
the witness as to what his usual custom or method was of con-
ducting examinations of that kind.66
In a similar case a physician was put on the stand
to testify in regard to the plaintiff's injuries. The de-
fendant, in cross-examination, attempted to discredit the
witness by questions regarding professional opinions he
had given in other suits which had been brought against
the same defendant to recover damages for personal in-
juries. Cross-examination upon independent cases of the
same character and about the same time as the principal
case was held to be improper.67
Examination on motive and payment is proper, how-
ever, and no doubt of some use in the examination of a
professional witness. The court has said:
It is urged that it was error, on cross-examination, to ask the
doctors introduced by appellant by whom they were sent and
paid. We do not think so. It is always competent, on cross-
examination, to ask a witness if he is in the employ of party, or
if at the time he rendered the particular service he was in the
employ of such party, for the purpose of showing his relation to
the case and his interest in it, as affecting his credibility, and
weight of his evidence. It being proper to ask the question,
and the evidence being properly in the record, it could be con-
sidered on any proposition it tended to establish.68
Let us next consider the propriety of examining a
physician, or other expert, with regard to texts, recog-
nized as authority on the matter testified to by the
66 Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Banfill, 206
Ill 553.
67 Chicago & Eastern Illinois R. R. Co. v. Schmitz, 211 Ill. 446.
6S Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Carroll, 206 I1. 318.
CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW
expert. Several cases on the subject clear the proper
way to do this. One, in the language of the court, arose
in this manner:
On the other point made, no medical books were read to
the jury as evidence, or for any other purpose, and it will not
be necessary to discuss the admissibility of such evidence. But
on cross-examination of the attending physician, who made a
diagnosis of the disease of which the assured died, and pro-
nounced it delirium tremens, paragraphs from standard authors,
that treat of that disease, were read to the witness, and
he was asked whether he agreed with the authors, and that is
complained of as error hurtful to the cause of defendant. The
testimony of this witness was of the utmost importance, and
certainly plaintiff was entitled to reasonable latitude in the
cross-examination. The witness had given the symptoms of the
disease with which the assured was affected and pronounced it
delerium tremens, and as a matter of right, plaintiff might test
the knowledge possessed by the witness, of that disease, by any
fair means that promised to elicit the truth. It will be conceded
it might be done by asking proper and pertinent questions, and
what possible difference could it make whether the questions
were read out of a medical book, or framed by counsel for that
purpose. Ordinarily, the limits of cross-examination of a witness
are within the sound discretion of the court, and, usually, the
greatest latitude is allowable that can consistently be given, for
the discovery of the truth. The witness in this case stated that
he had read textbooks that he might be able to state why he
"diagnosed the case as delerium tremen." [If he was] * * *
familiar with standard works that treat of delerium tremens,
it was not unfair to the witness to call his attention to the defini-
tions given in the books of that particular disease and to ask him
whether he concurred in the definitions. How could a witness's
knowledge of such subjects be more fully tested? That is, in
no just sense, reading books to the jury as evidence or, for the
purpose of contradicting the witness. The rule announced may
be liable to abuse. Great care should always be taken by the
court to confine such cross-examination within reasonable limits
and to see that the quotations read to the witness are so fairly
THE SCOPE OF CROSS-EXAMINATION
selected as to present the author's views on the subject of the
examination. 69
The above case was subsequently approved in a later
case 70 and then was qualified in such a manner as to cre-
ate doubt regarding the proper rule. In this latter case
there was no reference made on direct examination to
books. On cross-examination the witness was asked if he
was acquainted with the standard works on midwifery.
He was made to name these works as standard. Counsel
read at length from the books and asked the witness if
he was in accord with the authors. This was assigned as
error, and the court held that it was. The case quoted
at length above is distinguished in this manner:
Where a witness says a thing or a theory is so because a book
says that it is so, and the book, on being produced, is discovered
to say directly to the contrary, there is a direct contradiction
which anybody can understand. But where a witness simply
gives his opinion as to the proper treatment of a given disease
or injury, and a book is produced recommending a different
treatment, at most the repugnance is not of fact, but of the-
ory; and any number of additional books expressing different
theories, would obviously be quite as competent as the first. But
since books are not admissible as original evidence in such cases,
it must follow that they are not admissible on cross-examination,
where their introduction is not for the direct contradiction of
something asserted by the witness, but simply to prove a con-
trary theory.71
It will be seen that this case illustrates an unfair con-
struction of the first case by the counsel cross-examining
and is within the rule as laid down. The attempt here
was to discredit the witness's theory and not his testi-
mony.
The next case was sought to be reversed because of
alleged error of the court in permitting cross-examina-
69 Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Ellis, Admr., 89 I1. 516.
70 North Chicago Rolling Mill Co. v. Monka, 107 Ill. 340.
7 City of Bloomington v. Shrock, 110 Ill. 219.
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tion in which the witness was asked to name authorities
supporting the proposition to which he testified. The
higher court said, "An expert witness may be cross-
examined as to 'the basis of his opinion, as to whether
the authorities do not lay down a different doctrine and
the like.' ,,72 This case injects a new factor-the permis-
sibility of bringing out for the first time by cross-
examination whether the expert's opinion is based on
authority.
A witness was called in one case to testify that the
disease from which the plaintiff suffered was not the
result of the injuries received. The court held that it
was improper to contradict an expert by scientific books
where there was no reference made thereto on direct,
and that this could not be done indirectly, in the manner
shown as proper in the preceding cases. 73
It was left for the court in a later case to explain the
rule clearly. On direct examination the witness was
asked his opinion. He stated that he based his opinion
on experience and on books, although he did not specifi-
cally name them. On cross-examination he was asked to
name the authorities on which he based his opinion.
When he had named them, he was asked if the books did
not state an opinion which differed from his. Excerpts
from the books were read to illustrate this. This line of
questioning was applied to two experts. The following
language states the rule ultimately arrived at:
Having expressed an opinion upon matter material to the issue,
a medical expert witness may be cross-examined as to whether
that opinion is based upon personal experience, or upon books
which he has read, and this whether he has stated in his direct
examination the basis of his opinion. Should he testify for the
first time upon cross-examination that his opinion is based upon
what he has read, counsel has the same right to interrogate him
as to the authorities upon which he relies, and then contradict
him with those authorities, if he can, the same as if he had testi-
fied in direct examination that his opinion was based upon such
72 Chicago Union Traction Co. v. Ertrachter, 228 Ill. 114.
73 Ullrich v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 265 ni1. 338.
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authorities. The mere fact that the witness on direct examina-
tion has expressed his opinion generally will not foreclose coun-
sel, upon cross-examination, from eliciting from the witness the
basis of his opinion.74
Books of account that are voluminous may be proved
by a witness who has examined them and has made a
summary for the purpose of the suit.7 5  The question
arises whether the original books may be referred to on
cross-examination to impeach the correctness of his
summary. In answer to this, the Supreme Court said it
was permissible to cross-examine, from the original
books, an expert who has prepared a summary from
voluminous books to ascertain the correctness of his con-
clusions. 70
Opinion evidence in the proof of handwriting is the
next topic to review in determining the rules of cross-
examination. A witness was called to prove the signa-
ture. He said that he had seen the party write and that
he knew her handwriting. Counsel showed witness other
notes where her name was signed differently. Objection
was sustained to this mode of examination. The court
said:
The several notes which the witnesses had seen Mrs. Williams
execute, upon which they predicated their opinion that the sig-
nature to the note in question was genuine, were produced and
shown the witnesses. Now if, in the execution of all of these
notes, Mrs. Williams wrote her given name "Allie" instead of
"Alice," no reason is perceived why it was not competent to
establish such fact on cross-examination, for the purpose of
testing the soundness of the opinion given by the witnesses that
the signature to the note in question was genuine. In many
cases, in order to ascertain the truth and arrive at the correct
result, it is necessary that considerable latitude be given on the
cross-examination of witnesses, in order to test the accuracy of
their evidence. The genuineness of the signatures to the several
74 Wilcox v. International Harvester Co., 278 III. 465.
75 The People v. Sawhill, 299 Ii. 393.
76 The People v. Sawhtll, 299 Ill. 393.
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notes to which the attention of the witnesses was called was
not in controversy, and the purpose was not to prove a signature
by comparison but . . to test the accuracy of the witness's
opinion or judgment, which had, in the direct examination, gone
to the jury. If the witnesses, called by the plaintiff to prove
that the signature of Mrs. Williams on the note in question
was genuine, predicated their judgment, in whole or in part,
upon signatures to notes they saw her sign, and the signatures
to those notes differed from the signature to the note in question,
it seems plain that the defendant had the right to call out that
fact on cross-examination, as it was a fact proper for the con-
sideration of the jury in determining what weight they should
give to the opinions of the witnesses who gave their opinion
that the note was genuine.77
In another case in point, the witness who was called
to prove the signature was shown the signature of the
party attached to the plea. The witness had testified
that he had gone to school with the party and had seen
him write. It was held that where a signature is ad-
mitted, it is proper to cross-examine on this signature
to enable the witness to determine how accurate and
reliable is the impression of the party's signature as
fixed in the memory of the witness-as it confirms or
modifies his previous expressed opinion .7
We have seen that more than ordinary latitude is
allowed, as a general rule in criminal cases. The general
rule as to the scope of cross-examination prevails, how-
ever, when the examination is prejudicial to the defendant
and, on collateral matter, foreign to the issues. So it
was held that cross-examination of the witness to show
that the defendant had been guilty of loose moral con-
duct with other women, which examination extended
beyond the necessity for proving a motive, that is, loss
of love for his wife whom he was alleged to have mur-
dered, was improper.7 9
77 Bevan v. Atlanta National Bank, 142 Ill. 302.
78Melvin et al. v. Hodges, 71 Iln. 422.
79 The People v. Cleminson, 250 Ill. 135.
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Examination prejudicial to the witness is proper, how-
ever, where the matter thus elicited is not collateral or
foreign to the issues. For example, where there was
testimony on direct examination that the occupation of
the witness was that of a laundryman, it was held to be
proper on cross-examination to ask the witness if, as a
matter of fact, he did not run an opium den.80 So too,
it was held proper to ask a witness accused of auto
thievery about the operation and driving of an automo-
bile."' And in an arson case where it was proved that
the fire in question was postponed on account of another
fire, it was proper to ask the witness on cross-examination
concerning the other fire.82 Where a witness had testified
that neither he nor the defendant was drunk at the time
a crime was committed, it was proper to cross-examine
him as to what they had been doing up until the time
of the crime, how many saloons they had visited, and
what they had had to drink.83 And where the party
accused of performing abortion resulting in death was
shown to have performed other operations resulting in
death, it was proper on cross-examination to ask if
visions of those who had died did not come to the
accused.84
Where one of two joint defendants was placed on the
stand as a state's witness, and was asked on cross-
examination whether he had spoken to anyone concerning
any leniency to be given because of his testimony, the
trial judge refused to allow the answer because it was
not shown that he had talked with anyone in authority.
But this was held to be error, since it was material for
the jury to consider whether the witness had any hopes
of lessening his punishment, whether he had any cause
to believe it or not.85
80 Bow v. The People, 160 111. 438.
81 The People v. Scott, 261 Inl. 165.
82 The People v. Harris, 263 Ill. 406.
83 The People v. White, 251 Ill. 67.
84 The People v. Hagenow, 236 111. 514.
85Stevens v. The People, 215 Ill. 593.
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Where the reputation of the accused was testified to on
direct, it was quite proper to show that the witnesses did
not know of the reputation of the accused prior to the
murder which had occurred some time before the trial.86
The accused was shown on direct to have called the
deceased a name, and the deceased went to the office of
the accused in response thereto. It was held proper to
bring out on cross-examination the fact that deceased
had gone to the office of the accused many times. It was
also held that it was proper in the examination of a wit-
ness introducing the dying declaration of the deceased,
to show that profane language was used by the deceased
when he made it.87 So where the witness said that the
accused had called the deceased a vile name, it was held
error to exclude cross-examination of the witness as to
the fact that he had not said the same on a former
examination. 8
In a trial for assault with intent to commit murder,
there had been considerable feeling in the community
against the defendant. A witness was cross-examined on
the feeling expressed by those present towards the defen-
dant at the time the offense was committed. It was held
error to refuse this line of questioning. 9 It is improper
to refuse to allow cross-examination by questions which
assume that a previous answer of the witness is untrue.90
Where the accused was indicted for murder as the result
of an altercation over cards, and it was not shown that
the habits of the accused were bad, it was held error to
permit cross-examination showing that the accused had
at other times visited saloons and billiard parlors, where
he drank and played cards.9 1
On the question of reputation of the plaintiff in a civil
case, there is an interesting case in Illinois. The plain-
86 Halloway v. The People, 181 I1. 544.
87 Tracy v. The People, 97 Ill. 101.
88 Ritzman v. The People, 110 Ill. 362.
89 Davids v. The People, 192 Ill. 176.
90 Briggs v. The People, 219 Ill. 330.
91 Hayward v. The People, 96 Ill. 492.
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tiff brought suit against an attorney, alleging that she
had employed him to procure a divorce for her, that she
had supposed that he had done so, and that in conse-
quence she had married again, claiming damages for the
loss and injury to her reputation. No testimony as to
her character was brought out in her direct examination,
but on cross the defendant sought to show that she had
been a lewd woman, and had met the second husband in a
bawdy house in Danville, evidence about the admissibility
of which there could be no question, had it been intro-
duced in the proper way. It was held that this was
improper cross-examination, where there was no cor-
responding evidence called for on direct.92
Whether examination of a witness by the court may be
assigned as error in a civil case has been emphatically
decided in the negative. The Supreme Court said, "The
right of the court to examine a witness, after he has
been examined by the parties, cannot be questioned, and
it was a matter of discretion to permit a cross-exami-
nation. It cannot be assigned as error."9 3
It has repeatedly been held that in a bastardy case it
is proper to cross-examine the complaining witness on
her conduct with other men at about the time of the
gestation.9 4
Cross-examination on custom or habit is the next topic
to consider. There was testimony on the direct exami-
nation that section men were in the habit of clearing the
track when a locomotive was approaching. The witness
was asked on cross-examination whether it was not the
custom of the defendant company and of all companies
to have a foreman and a section man warn the working-
men. The witness replied that the foreman could not
always be with the men, but that he should be unless his
92 Hill v. Montgomery, 184 Ill. 220.
93Foreman v. Baldwin, 24 Ill. 298.
94Robnett v. The People, 16 Ill. App. 299; The People v. Moore, 188
Ill. App. 418; The People, ex rel. Guy v. Janos, 157 Ill. App. 307.
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work calls him away, and that when he is present it is
customary for him to look out for passing engines and
to warn the laborers.9 5
In a suit against a carrier for negligence in the car-
riage of goods, it was held proper to ask the witness if
the rate testified to on direct had ever been made to any
other person for carriage between the same two points. 6
And in an action for the recovery of money lost in the
hands of a carrier, after direct examination on the habit
of drivers in making delivery of parcels and taking re-
ceipts, it was held proper to ask if it was not the habit
of the driver in question to steal money parcels, and if
he had not been arrested and given up money and jew-
elry and escaped.9 7
But it was held that where questions as to the careless-
ness of an elevator operator in a mine had no basis on
direct, questions concerning such carelessness were im-
proper on cross-examination.9 8
Where a witness has offered merely formal proof, the
question arises as to the latitude to be given in cross-
examining him. As a general rule, where a witness is
called to prove handwriting, his cross-examination is to
be confined to that subject.9 9 And where an affidavit only
has been introduced to prove a deed in compliance with
the statute, it is improper to allow cross-examination of
the witness,100 although where the same matter is intro-
duced orally, the witness is subject to cross-examination. 10 1
The physical condition of witnesses is often material.
It has been held that it is error to permit a witness to
be asked to submit to examination by the opposing par-
ties to test the extent of the injuries.10 2 But this is not
95 Pittsburgh, Cincinnati & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. McGrath, 115 Ill.
172.
96 Black v. Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Ry. Co., 111 Ill. 351.
97 American Express Co. v. Haggard, 37 Ill. 465.
98 Staunton Coal Co. v. Bub, 218 Ill. 125.
99 Hurlbut, use, etc. v. Meeker, Ex'r., 104 I1. 541.
100 Glos v. Garrett, 219 Ill. 208.
101 Scott v. Bassett, 174 I1. 390.
102 Kusturin v. Chicago & Alton R. R. Co., 287 Iii. 306.
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necessarily error when asked and refused by the court
before a jury.lua Where the plaintiff produced evidence
to show that Bright's disease of the kidneys had been
occasioned by the fall which was the basis of the suit,
and offered proofs based upon urine tests, it was proper
to ask on cross-examination whether upon a former trial
he had offered any such proof. He was also asked to
furnish urine for a chemical examination, to which ques-
tion an objection was sustained. It was held error to
deny this cross-examination, on the ground that there
was a right to show the jury this lack of proof on the
former trial, to let them determine whether it was ficti-
tious or well founded, evidence having already been
admitted which tended to show that a microscopic exami-
nation of the urine would verify the plaintiff's claim. 0 4
The plaintiff's disabilities were disputed and she was
cross-examined on work she had done after the accident
in caring for an invalid. She had already answered that
she had not helped to care for the patient. She was
further interrogated as to whether she had not carried
food up to the invalid from the basement. The court
refused to allow the answer on the ground that the pre-
vious answer had included it. This ruling was held
improper. "Where the extent of plaintiff's disabilities
is in dispute and they are of such character as they may
be feigned, wide latitude should be allowed counsel in
cross-examining. ' 0 5
Examination concerning the general question of value
next draws our attention. Where a suit is brought to
recover a specific contract price and there is no evidence
on direct as to the cost of construction, it is improper
on cross-examination to question concerning such cost. 08
The amount of compensation to be paid for a tank was in
dispute, and cross-examination was permitted as to the
cost of construction, although this had not been men-
103 City of Chicago v. McNally, 227 Ill. 14.
104 City of Freeport v. Isbell, 93 Ill. 381.
105 Chicago Union Traction Co. v. Miller, 212 Ill. 49.
106 Streator Telephone Co. v. Construction Co., 217 Ill. 577.
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tioned on direct. This was held to be improper. 0 7 Where
value of land condemned was alleged of greater value
on direct because of contemplated building for which
plans had been made, it was not improper to ask if the
ones so planning were not insolvent, and if the plans had
not been prepared for several years. 08 Where a witness
says that stock is worth par, it is proper to ask if it has
ever paid a dividend. 0 9 Where the direct examination
was on services performed and amount paid, it was im-
proper to cross-examine as to the value of the services. 110
A witness in proving her damages in a personal injury
case testified that she had received fifty cents a day, but
that she had made arrangements to go into business for
herself where $2.60 daily would be the results of her
efforts. The examination was carried on along the same
line on cross-examination which was improper under the
pleadings, but it was held that since counsel for the
defendant examined on it, he waived his objection.'
The next topic we have to consider is the physical con-
dition surrounding the scene of the accident and the
cause of the same. Where the issue under the pleadings
was as to the condition of certain railroad ties, and evi-
dence was called on direct to prove that they were in
good condition at the time of the accident, it was proper
to show on cross-examination that the ties were removed
a week after the accident and that they were then
rotten. 1 2 So in a similar case it is said, "Appellant
showed by another witness that switchstands like the one
in question had been in general use for the last twenty
years. Appellee was properly permitted to show, on
cross-examination, that they were now being replaced by
others of a later pattern. This was germane to the
examination in chief.' "'s
107 Chicago & Rock Island R. Co. v. Northern Illinois Coal & Iron Co.,
36 Ill. 60.
108 Bradley Mfg. Co. v. Traction Co., 229 Ill. 170.
109 Hughes v. Ferriman, 119 Ill. App. 169.
110 Morse v. Goetz, 51 Ill. App. 485.
111 City of Beardstown v. Smith, 150 Ill. 169.
112 Hayes v. Wabash R. R. Co., 180 Ill. App. 511.
113 Chicago & Alton R. R. Co. v. Howell, 208 Ill. 155.
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A witness testified that there was no way to tell
whether a stay bolt was cracked or defective other than
to take the engine apart. Upon cross-examination he was
asked whether, if there were a hollow stay bolt, it would
not show by the leakage that it was cracked. This was
proper.114
Where the action was based on a single act of negli-
gence in allowing a pile of cinders to remain near the
track in the yards, it was held proper on cross-exami-
nation to show knowledge on the part of the defendant by
examining as to other such piles located similarly." 5
And where a mine examiner testified in chief that he
had examined the room in which deceased met his death
on the same morning, it was proper to show on cross-
examination that the examiner could not have examined
as many rooms as he said that he did properly in that
length of time."" Where the father of the deceased testi-
fied that he had heard that there were others present
at the time when his son met his death, and that he had
learned the name of one, it is improper to ask the witness
to name that one."I7
It is held that objection may not be made by the party
cross-examining to the competence of the evidence that
has been elicited by him."" And where collateral matters
are so brought out, they are not the basis for impeach-
ment of the witness. 119 Even where the incompetent
matter was brought out on direct, it is not error to refuse
cross-examination as to that matter.120  But it has been
held that rulings on collateral matters are within the
114 Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Prickett, 210 Ill. 140.
115 Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Rathburn, 190 Ill. 572.
116 Mertens v. Southern Coal Co., 235 Ill. 540.
117 Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Strong, 230 Ill. 58.
118 Board of Trade Tel. Co. v. Blume, 176 Ill. 247; Emerick v. Hile-
man, 177 Ill. 368.
119 Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R. R. Co. v. Bell, Admr., 70 Ill.
102; Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. R. Co. v. Lee, 60 Ill. 501.
120 Mueller v. Phelps, 252 Ill. 630.
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discretion of the trial court.121 Personal feelings of the
witness are not collateral to the direct examinations. 122
To the reader who examines the cases herein cited, it
will appear that there is no practical rule to govern the
conduct of all cross-examination, except the rule "that
cross-examination is confined to the matters brought
forth on direct examination." It is difficult to formulate
a more specific rule. A study of the different classes of
cases will be of great assistance in devising means of
introducing important evidence not otherwise admissible
on direct examination. If, however, a case arises, where,
upon the particular facts, the latitude to be permitted
has not previously been decided, one might formulate as
a guiding principle the statement that, as the eliciting
of truth from the witness on cross-examination appears
to the court more difficult because of the issue involved
or the prejudice of the witness, the scope of cross-
examination proportionately grows wider.
121 City of Spring Valley v. Gavin, 182 Il1. 232.
122 Phenix v. Castner, 108 Ill. 207; Aneals et al. v. The People, 134
11. 401.
